A prosecution which is an abuse of process is to be stayed. This will be only in an extreme or singular case because it is only in such a case that nothing that a trial judge can do in the conduct of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences; there is no definitive category of extreme cases in which a permanent stay of criminal proceedings will be ordered: Dupas v R HCA 20, (2010) 241 CLR 237 at 243. Some of the categories that have arisen for consideration in particular cases are set out below.
Prosecution proceeding in an oppressive and unjust manner: Clark (a Pseudonym) v R  VSCA 96 (interlocutory partial consideration of prosecution attempt to proceed to further trial after three juries unable to agree on verdict).
There are cases, decided either way, in which the destruction of evidence has been relied upon as the basis for an application for a permanent stay: R v Edwards HCA 20, (2009) 83 ALJR 717; Audsley v R  VSCA 41; El Bayeh v R VSCA 44; Aydin v R VSCA 190; Wells v R  VSCA 100.
> Admissions and confessions
version 25 March 2016
First-hand evidence of admissions is as a general rule admissible: Evidence Act ss.81-90.
In some contexts a difference is made between "an admission" being a statement by an accused which inculpates that accused in part; and "a confession." being admissions by an accused which taken together fully acknowledge the elements of the offence: cf Magill v R  VSCA 259 and earlier common law. EXTENSIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN VICTORIA WHERE ALLEGED MADE IN CUSTODY Crimes Act sections 464-464J; twin premises of being in custody and suspected: R v Alexander VicRp 58, 2 VR 249.
EXCLUSION FROM EVIDENCE OF ADMISSIONS Inadmissibility of admissions influenced by violence and certain other conduct. Evidence of an admission is not admissible unless the court is satisfied that the admission, and the making of the admission, were not influenced by - (a) violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person; or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind: Evidence Act s.84. Inadmissibility of admissions to investigating official unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected: Evidence Act s.85; Soteriou v R  VSCA 328.Amongst matters to be taken into account are the condition or characteristics of the person, the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put., and the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made. Discretion to exclude admissions: In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if (a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and (b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to an accused to use the evidence: Evidence Act s.90. Exclusion of improperly or illegally obtained evidence:Evidence Act s.138 has provisions specifically dealing with admissions made during or in consequence of questioning (and evidence obtained in consequence of the admission). Breach of Crimes Act s.464C (right to communicate with friend, relative and legal practitioner); DPP v MD  VSCA 233. R v Swaffield HCA 1, (1998) 192 CLR 159; R v Thomas  VSCA 165, (2006) 14 VR 475, 497. Exclusion for unfair prejudice: Evidence Act s.137. This is a rule not confined to confessional evidence.
EXCLUSION FROM EVIDENCE OF PARTS OF AN INTERVIEW In practice, entire exclusion is uncommon, but exclusion of portions is common, and often by agreement with prosecution. There are many possible reasons, some being irrelevance (either from outset or by intervening circumstances), isolated prejudicial answers or objectionable questioning, legitimate invoking of right to silence, prolixity.
NEED FOR AUDIO RECORDING OF CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS Crimes Act s.464H; R v Heaney VicRp 85,  2 VR 531. The requirement where it arises is for audio-recording. Where separate periods of questioning, a recorded period within 464H (1)(c) is admissible: Heatherington v R  HCA 19, (1994) 179 CLR 370; Pollard v R HCA 69,(1992) 176 CLR 177. Where single period of questioning partially recorded, that portion is admissible if it is within 464H (1)(c): Vu v Randoe  VicSc 115. The discretion under s.464H(2) to rule admissible: R v Nicoletti  VSCA 175, (2006) 164 A Crim R 81. Section 464H inapplicable to overheard admission: R v Schaeffer [  VSCA 306, (2005) 13 VR 337.
DIRECTIONS TO JURY Depending on the circumstances of the case, a judge may need to direct a jury that unless it is satisfied to the requisite standard that so much of a confession as tended to show guilt was true, the jury cannot treat it as proof of guilt: Magill v R VSCA 259; R v Mitchell VSCA 289; R v Schaeffer VSCA 306, (2005) 13 VR 337; Burns v R HCA 258, (1975) 132 CLR 258. The direction may be applicable to some admissions: R v Russo (No 2) VSCA 297.
Where a charge clearly indicates an offence but in its statement there is some slip or clumsiness, there may be amendment; a charge which contains nothing which can identify it with any offence known to the law is not be covered by power of amendment: Broome v Chenoweth HCA 53, (1946) 73 CLR 583.
A trial judge can grant leave to amend the wording of a count even after a verdict of guilty has been returned; in one case, the amendment involved including a reference to the particular statute said to have been contravened in the count, though no one had been under any misapprehension as to the source of that offence throughout the trial, and prior to verdict; minor amendments of that nature should be able to be made at any stage of a proceeding: there are many examples of appellate courts having approached the question of amendment in this way, and having declined to quash convictions based upon errors of an entirely formal nature: OAA v R  VSCA 155.
The general rule is that any person accused of an offence and being held in custody in relation to that offence pending trial shall be granted bail: section 4(1).
One group of exceptions concerns charges of murder or treason where bail is to be granted only if the court is satisfied exceptional circumstances exist: section 4(2)(a) and section 13. Another group of exceptions concerns some listed major drug offences and terrorism offences where bail is to be granted only if the court is satisfied exceptional circumstances exist: section 4 (2)(aa) and (2)(b). As to exceptional circumstances: YSA v DPP VSCA 149; DPP v Koumis  VSC 416; Tran v DPP VSC 498; DPP v Cozzi VSC 195, (2005) 12 VR 211; DPP v Bernath VSC 304.
Another group of exceptions is where the court is satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk if the that the accused is released on bail, or that it has not been practicable to obtain sufficient information for the purpose of deciding any such question : provided by and further explained especially in section 4 (2)(d) and (3).
Another group of exceptions concerns charges of various other listed circumstances for which the court shall refuse bail unless the accused shows cause why his detention in custody is not justified: section 4(4); Robinson v R  VSCA 161.
See further as to determination in relation to an Aboriginal person: section 3A.
See further as to determination in relation to a child: section 3B.
Inherent power of Supreme Court to entertain an appeal against refusal of bail: R v Durose  VicRp 13,  VR 176. Statutory power of Supreme Court to entertain an appeal by DPP against grant of bail: Bail Act s.18A.
Absconding. After failure to appear (in County and Supreme Courts the practice is thrice calling by tipstaff), the Undertaking of Bail for appearance at trial is tendered. Any surety or sureties are then likewise called. Then usually order sought for forfeiture of undertaking of bail together with the amounts undertaken by any surety. Forfeiture is mandatory: see Crown Proceedings Act s.6(1). Exception - illness, accident or other sufficient cause: Bail Act s.16(3). Forfeiture of the undertaking of a surety is mandatory upon forfeiture of the undertaking of bail. A surety might be able to pre-empt the matter by an application under the Bail Act s.23. A surety has a right to apply for an order varying or rescinding the forfeiture: Crown Proceedings Act s.6(4); DPP v Mokbel  VSCA 195. Forfeiture by person bailed: Bail Act s.32. Court may issue warrant for arrest of accused: Bail Act s.26(2).
Bail pending conviction or sentence appeal to Court of Appeal will ordinarily be exercised by the Court of Appeal and granted only in very exceptional circumstances: Criminal Procedure Act s.310. On conviction appeal:Ash v R  VSCA 117; R v Pandevski VSCA 84. On sentence appeal: Re Zoudi VSCA 298; (2006) 14 VR 580;Re Schaefer  VSCA 268.
> Calling of prosecution witnesses
version 1 October 2013
Discretion of trial prosecutor. "A refusal to call the witness will be justified only by reference to the overriding interests of justice. Such occasions are likely to be rare. The unreliability of the evidence will only suffice where there are identifiable circumstances which clearly establish it; it will not be enough that the prosecutor merely has a suspicion about the unreliability of the evidence. In most cases where a prosecutor does not wish to lead evidence from a person named on the indictment but the defence wishes that person to be called, it will be sufficient for the prosecutor simply to call the person so that he may be cross-examined by the defence and then, if necessary, be re-examined": R v Apostolides HCA 38, (1984) 154 CLR 563; also Coulson v R VSCA 146; Svajcer v R  VSCA 116; R v Chimirri VSCA 57;R v Jensen  VSCA 266; R v Martin  VSCA 163. In general, the Crown would be expected to call eye witnesses of any events which go to prove the elements of the crime charged even though they give accounts inconsistent with the Crown case and the names of such persons would, ordinarily, in conformity with Presentment Rule 4(1) be endorsed on the presentment: R v Armstrong VICSC 350, 4 VR 533.
Prosecution calling of witnesses whose evidence is to be criticised by it generally is unobjectionable: R v Macfie (No 2)  VSCA 209, (2004) 11 VR 215. Where the prosecution does call a witness it may not attack the credit of that witness in final address without laying grounds for that attack: DeVries v R  VSCA 210. Calling simply for cross-examination: R v Komornick VicRp 81, VR 845.
> Change of plea
version 20 January 2016
Once plea of guilty has been entered at County Court or Supreme Court arraignment, change to plea of not guilty requires permission of the Judge which may be granted at any time until sentence is passed, or in the event it has been made as part of a mixed plea before jury, until verdict. Whether to grant permission is a discretion; the test is whether not to allow change would be a miscarriage of justice: Maxwell v R  HCA 62, (1995) 184 CLR 501; Kumar v R  VSCA 102; Brooks v R  VSCA 322; R v Holden VSCA 254;R v Douglass  VSCA 37, (2004) 9 VR 355.
Where it is sought to alter plea of guilty before conviction and sentence, the judge may entertain that course upon finding a circumstance established that affects the integrity of the plea. Even if the plea was free and voluntary it will also be within a sound exercise of the discretion to allow the applicant to change his plea before conviction and sentence if the applicant establish that he did not believe himself to be guilty at the time of the plea but pleaded guilty in order to gain some technical advantage. Where the integrity of the plea is first challenged after conviction, proof of a circumstance, that compromises the integrity of the plea is necessary. a miscarriage will only arise where some objective circumstance is established that permits the judge to conclude that the plea was attributable to that circumstance and not to a consciousness of guilt. Weston v R (a pseudonym)  VSCA 354.
Use upon trial of former plea of guilty or indication of intention to plead guilty: R v Constantinou VSCA 257; R v Rustum VSCA 142; R v D'orta-Ekenaike  VICSC 31,  2 VR 140. Directions must be given to jury if use permitted.
If a change of plea to guilty after arraignment before jury, the judge may discharge the jury from delivering a verdict on the charge and instead direct that an entry of guilty be made: Criminal Procedure Act s.241.
> Committal proceedings, indictment
version 7 October 2015
Committal. proceedings: Purpose amongst others is for a Magistrate to determine whether there is evidence of sufficient weight to support a conviction for the offence charged: if so the Magistrate commits for trial on the charge or if not so discharges the person: Criminal Procedure Act.ss.94-148; McKenzie v Magistrates' Court of Victoria.  VSCA 81.
It is comparable though not identical with Commonwealth prosecutions: R v Holden VSCA 63; R v Nicola  VicRp 86,  VR 1040.
A Victoria (or any other State) law which to any extent is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth is invalid to that extent and indictment relying on such law to that extent is to be quashed: Constitution of Australia s.109; Dickson v R  HCA 30, (2010) 241 CLR 491.
> Contents of documents as evidence
version 14 September 2015
A party may adduce evidence of the contents of a document in question by tendering the document in question or by any one or more of various other specified methods: Evidence Act s.48. However this is subject to the application of the other rules and discretions limiting the adducing of any evidence. Prominent amongst these are the rules against hearsay though they are of reduced scope as to business records, tags labels and writing, and electronic communications: ss.69-71.
Document has a wide meaning: Evidence Act Dictionary Part 1. On meaning of business records: Lancaster v R  VSCA 333.
If a question arises as to the relevance of a document or thing, the court may examine it and may draw any reasonable inference from it, including an inference as to its authenticity or identity : s.58.
Evidence produced by processes, machines and other devices: ss.146-147.
On persons who may give the evidence of a fact whichprovision s require to be proved in relation to a document : ss.170-171.
version 6 March 2016
Provision against improper question or improper questioning:Evidence Act s.41. Questions should not include comment and personal views of the cross-examiner, nor be of compound structure, invite argument or interrupt answers: Libke v R HCA 30, (2007) 230 CLR 559. Cross-examination bounds considered in Wakeley v R HCA 23, (1990) 64 ALJR 321.
Cross examination of an accused as to whether a witness is lying is improper unless the defence has positively asserted that the witness was lying: Skinner (a Pseudonym) v R  VSCA 26; Reeves v R VSCA 311; Martin v R  VSCA 153; R v HRA VSCA 56; R v Davis  VSCA 276; R v SWC VSCA 201; R v Gell VSCA 255; R v MMJ  VSCA 226; R v Bajic  VSCA 158, (2005) 12 VR 155; R v Buckley  VSCA 185, (2004) 10 VR 215. It is legitimate to suggest to the witness that the witness is in error and to invite the witness in view of someone else's testimony to modify the story or admit the possibility of error; a witness can be asked if what another witness has said is true.
Cross-examination may be to credit if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness, subject in some circumstances to leave: Evidence Act ss103-104. Leave is not required for cross-examination whether the witness is biased or has a motive to be untruthful, or is, or was, unable to be aware of or recall matters to which his or her evidence relates, or has made a prior inconsistent statement. Alleged facts put merely to credit should be subject of direction to jury as to their limited function. Independent evidence to contradict answers given by a witness in cross-examination as to credit ordinarily is admissible in defined circumstances some requiring leave: Evidence Act s.106. This provision appears to displace the common law collateral evidence rule referred to in R v BDX  VSCA 2, (2009) 194 A Crim R 57.
Prior statements of witness, where inconsistent with testimony, may be put to the witness against credit and, if denied, proved against credit and as evidence of the facts asserted: Evidence Act ss.43, 106. Generally, prior consistent statements cannot be put to witness unless to re-establish credibility: Evidence Act ss.101A, 102, 108; Constantinou v R  VSCA 177; Niaros v R  VSCA 249. Once the witness admits making the statement or it is proved, prior statement also becomes relevant as to the truth: Evidence Act s.60; Raimondi v R  VSCA 194.
The rule in Browne v Dunn is essentially that a party is obliged to give appropriate notice to the other party, and in cross-examination of that person's witnesses, of any imputation that the former intends to make against either of the latter about his or her conduct relevant to the case, or a party's or a witness' credit, but it is not for the defence to clear up, or resolve inconsistencies in the case for the prosecution: MWJ v R  HCA 74, (2005) 222 ALR 436 see also Nicholls v R  HCA 1, (2005) 219 CLR 196; Parsons (a Pseudonym) v R  VSCA 17; Drash v R VSCA 33; KC v R VSCA 82; R v Coswello VSCA 300; R v Morrow VSCA 291; R v Thompson VSCA 144; R v SWC VSCA 201; R v McLachlan  VSCA 127,  2 VR 553. In the circumstances of R v MG  VSCA 264, a direction to the jury that the rule had been breached was held erroneous. In the particular circumstances of R v ZW  VSCA 256, prosecution arguments to the jury that the rule had been breached were held legitimate. Where relevant, it is appropriate that an explanation for compliance with the rule be given to the jury: R v Demiri  VSCA 64. Where rule has been breached, the judge may comment adversely but cannot withdraw consideration of the defence argument from the jury: R v Rajakaruna (No 2)  VSCA 277, (2006) 15 VR 592. Where the rule has been breached but for good reason such as that such cross-examination would open up in re-examination prejudicial evidence, adverse comment by prosecutor or judge may have to be avoided to prevent miscarriage of justice: Bugeja v R  VSCA 321. It will seldom be desirable for a judge in a criminal trial to invite the jury to use breach of the rule in Browne v Dunn as the basis for an inference that the accused has made up evidence: Buchwald v R VSCA 445
The general rule is against putting other offences or bad character to an accused, see Evidence Act ss.110-112. In limited circumstances, there is a discretion to permit cross-examination of an accused as to bad character: Huges (a Pseudonym) v R  VSCA 338.
Subject to avoidance of unfairness, the prosecution is entitled to open fresh relevant issues in cross-examination of defence witnesses: R v Chin HCA 35, (1985) 157 CLR 671; Latorre v R  VSCA 280; R v Vonarx  VICSC 216,  3 VR 618; R v TSR  VSCA 87, (2002) 5 VR 627. On the unfairness in this context of splitting a prosecution case, see also R v Soma  HCA 13, (2003) 212 CLR 299.
Cross-examination by trial judge is permitted but it is not to endeavour to fill gaps in a Crown case; nor to ask questions of an accused or any other witness in order to raise an issue which the Crown and the accused have left alone; nor to ask leading questions of an accused or any other witness in an endeavour to throw doubt upon the witness's credit, particularly if the witness is the accused: R v Brdarovski VSCA 231, (2006) 166 A Crim R 366.
Basha enquiry. Where fairness requires, cross-examination before trial commences of prosecution witness not called at committal: R v Pham  VSCA 41; DPP v Denysenko  VICSC 4,  1 VR 312; R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 397.
Cross-examination on a document. Evidence Act s.35 abolishes a rule that if cross-examination goes beyond the part of the document used by the witness to refresh memory and the document has been called for and inspected, tender of the document can be required.
> Double jeopardy and other bars to re-litigation of issues
version 4 January 2013
There are various bars which can operate at a criminal court against the re-litigation of issues already concluded by conviction or acquittal. (1) Plea in bar - autrefois acquit or autrefois convict - prevents proceeding upon an alleged offence where there has already been a verdict for an offence the elements of which were identical or in which all of the elements were wholly included: Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act s.26; Pearce v R HCA 57, (1998) 194 CLR 610; R v Mason VSCA 55; R v Langdon VSCA 205, (2004) 11 VR 1. Some have expressed the view the underlying principle for this is res judicata. Plea in bar also prevents proceeding where there has been a verdict on an offence which is practically the same: Pearce v R; R v HMcL VSCA 61; R v Sessions  2 VR 304. Indeed, it may well be that, in given circumstances, a conviction on a lesser offence will create a bar to subsequent prosecution on a more serious offence; this will occur where the subsequent prosecution for more serious offence amounts to prosecution for an aggravated form of the offence earlier prosecuted, but relies for its proof on the same evidential fact: DPP v Collins  VSCA 179. There is no plea in bar where there has been a dismissal not on the merits: Davern v Messell HCA 34, (1984) 155 CLR 21; Howard v Pacholli  VicRp 83,  VR 833. There is no plea in bar where a charge or count has been subject of dismissal or directed acquittal for duplicity: R v VN VSCA 111, (2006) 162 A Crim R 195. It seems that in summary proceedings, no plea in bar is possible but the same principle is effected as stay for abuse of process. (2) Stay of proceeding for abuse of process, especially where it would be harsh or oppressive to pursue an offence arising out of some matters previously canvassed in a trial for another offence: R v Carroll HCA 55, (2002) 213 CLR 635; R v Clarkson VicRp 80,  VR 962. Also stay of proceeding or exclusion of evidence by reason of abuse of process where the proceeding or evidence conflicts with a previous acquittal for an offence the elements of which were practically the same: Pearce v R. (3) Interpretation of Legislation Act s.51 extends to prevent additional conviction under another law being recorded in respect of the same act or omission, the idea being that punishment, to which the section refers, includes conviction: R v Filipovic VSCA 14, (2008) 181 A Crim R 83; R v Ngo VSCA 240;R v Novak VSCA 46; R v Sessions  2 VR 304.
Statutory provisions applying in Victoria from 13 March 2012 effect some limited exceptions to double jeopardy by permitting the Court of Appeal to set aside acquittals (i) where there is in respect of an alleged very serious offence fresh and compelling evidence, (ii) where the original acquittal was tainted, (iii) where there is fresh evidence of an administration of justice offence in respect of an acquittal. Criminal Procedure Act ss.327A-327S.
Issue estoppel is the wider idea, known to civil law, that a legal or factual point necessarily determined as part of earlier court proceeding cannot be re-litigated. Except to the extent that the bars above might be seen by some as examples of it, issue estoppel does not have any application in criminal law: Rogers v R  HCA 42, (1994) 181 CLR 251 (per Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). However, at least sometimes abuse of process applies in such a situation to stay proceedings or exclude evidence, as for example with the previously excluded prosecution evidence in Rogers or evidence shown rejected by a previous acquittal on a related charge as in HP v R  VSCA 251. There are also principles directed to ensuring the incontrovertible character of judicial decisions which prevent re-litigating a precisely same point already decided by the same judge at the same trial, and perhaps go further.
> Evidence improperly or illegally obtained
version 1 January 2015
Evidence that was obtained - (a) improperly or in contravention of an Australian law; or (b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law - is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained: Evidence Act s.138; Ridgeway v R HCA 66, (1995) 184 CLR 19; Bunning v Cross  HCA 22, (1978) 141 CLR 54; Rich v R  VSCA 126; DPP v Marijancevic VSCA 355, (2011) 33 VR 440; R v Thomas  VSCA 165, (2006) 14 VR 475, R v Theophanous VSCA 78, (2003) 141 A Crim R 216.
> Expert opinion and lay opinion
version 7 April 2016
General inadmissibility of mere opinion
The opinion rule is that evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed: Evidence Act s.76. The rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed: s.77.
Evidence of an opinion of a person that is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on the person's training, study or experience is admissible and may extend to a fact in issue or an ultimate issue, or a matter of common knowledge: Evidence Act ss.79-80; Tuite v R  VSCA 148; Honeysett v R  HCA 29, (2014) 88 ALJR 786. Experience which is ad hoc, for example knowledge of voice identity gained in listening to recordings, may be sufficient to qualify a witness as expert: Kheir v R  VSCA 200.
Opinion as to credibility of a witness: Evidence Act s.108C. Credibility encompasses reliability: Dupas v R  VSCA 328, (2012) 40 VR 182. The provision explicitly recognises that in some circumstances opinion evidence may be adduced which is based upon specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse: MA v R  VSCA 20. In some circumstances, such evidence may be adduced in other contexts: Audsley v R  VSCA 321 (neuropsychologist as to effect of drug use on reliability of memory).
It is generally appropriate to instruct criminal juries to approach expert witnesses like any other witness and that it is for the jury and not the experts to determine the issues; however directions should recognise that the jury is not entitled to capriciously disregard expert evidence and should accept it unless there are facts which entitle them to reject or differ from the opinions of the experts: Kosian v R  VSCA 357; R v NCT  VSCA 240, (2009) 26 VR 247.
Note extensive scope of expert opinion Practice Notes for criminal proceedings: Supreme Court of Victoria Practice Note No 2 of 2014; County CourtPractice Note 1 of 2014. Include reference to overriding duty of experts to assist the court impartially. Also provisions for direction for experts to confer, and to prepare a statement for the Court of the matters on which they could reach agreement: DPP v Borg  VSCA 53.
Evidence Act s.78 has the effect of permitting reception of an opinion where the primary facts on which it is based are too evanescent to remember or too complicated to be separately narrated: it permits the conclusion to be stated where without it the evidence would not convey an adequate account or generate an adequate understanding of the witness’s perception of for example sobriety, age or emotional state being observed: Kheir v R  VSCA 200. Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander traditional laws and customs
The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group. Evidence Act s. 78A.
version 3 June 2016
Between states or territories of Australia A Commonwealth Act, the Service and Execution of Process Act, by sections 81-94 provides for the execution of warrants of apprehension from one state or territory of Australia to another, by order of a Magistrate. Bail pending a hearing to determine whether a person is to be extradited interstate is in accordance with the State in which the person is being held: s.88. Review by Supreme Court: s.86. Power to stay for oppression and unfairness: R v Lavelle (1994) 72 A Crim R 402.
To other countries A Commonwealth Act, the Extradition Act, provides for the execution of warrants of apprehension issued from other countries with which Australia has extradition treaties. For list of Australia extradition treaties, see at Attorney-General Dept (Cth) here (pdf) with full texts to be found at AUSTLII via here. Extradition Act procedures include decisions by the Attorney-General and a Magistrate: see further DPP v Kainhofer HCA 35, (1995) 185 CLR 528; Attorney-General v Tse  HCA 25, (1998) 193 CLR 128. Various regulations under the Extradition Act bring extradition treaties into Australian law: see Extradition Act s.11 and regulations for example United Kingdom; Commonwealth Countries, United States, Germany. The Magistrate is precluded from taking into account matters other than those set out in s.19(2) but their content varies according to the regulations applicable. See also Crimes (Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances) Act. Bail pending a hearing to determine whether a person is to be extradited overseas must be dealt with in accordance with Extradition Act s.15, s.32 (New Zealand). Review by Federal Court of an order for extradition: s.21; Republic of South Africa v Dutton FCA 708, (1997) 77 FCR 128; Federal Republic of Germany v Parker  FCA 803.
From other countries Is Commonwealth executive power: Oates v Attorney-General  HCA 21, (2003) 214 CLR 496. Confinement of trial to extradition offences or at least offences related to them: ("speciality") Extradition Act s.42; Truong v R HCA 10, (2004) 223 CLR 122.
this page iswww.justd.com/notes4.htm
page author Don Just barrister of Victorian Bar Melbourne, Victoria, Australia