Ordinarily there is no further appeal. In some unusual circumstances, there may be order 56 judicial review to Supreme Court: see below on this page.
To Supreme Court by section 272 appeal
An alternative course sometimes used is pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Act ss.272, 273 (formerly the section 92 appeal under Magistrates' Court Act and yet earlier known as order to review). It takes the case to a Judge of the Supreme Court. There is more detailed provision for such appeals provided by Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules order 3A.
Availability to prosecution. A feature of the s.272 type of appeal is that the prosecution has a much right of appeal as does a defendant. This contrasts with the quite limited right of prosecution appeal, otherwise available. Where the informant is a member of police, such appeals must be brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions on behalf of the informant: s.272(2). In practice this is usually done by naming the Appellant as "Director of Public Prosecutions (on behalf of ...)". Prosecution appeals are brought quite sparingly. In practice, the Office of Public Prosecutions usually acts for the prosecution upon s.272 appeals from police prosecutions, whether it be a defence or a prosecution appeal.
Restrictions. The availability of an appeal such as s.272 appeal has some major restrictions.
* It is confined to "questions of law", for example the meaning of statutory provisions (the drink driving laws have been a major source of case), the common law, the rules of evidence etc. In practice the tendency is to entertain "errors of law", not merely areas of unsettled law.
* It does not allow a re-hearing of factual disputes. It is however to raise a "question of law" to argue that a Magistrate has made a finding of fact that no reasonable Magistrate could have made:
Hardy v Gillette  VicRp36,  VR 392. This however is a difficult basis upon which to proceed, and is ill-advised except upon an extreme example.
* It does not allow a challenge to exercise of discretion by a Magistrate, although it is well settled that certain kinds of challenge to purported exercises of discretion do raise a "question of law". The leading case on this point remains Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth HCA 25, (1953) 94 CLR 621. To raise a question of law upon a purported exercise of discretion, it is necessary to argue the Magistrate has acted upon a wrong principle, allowed extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him or her, mistaken the facts or not taken into account some material consideration. "In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred." This however is also a difficult basis upon which to proceed, and is ill-advised except upon an extreme example.
* It must be from a "final order" (because s.272 expressly says so). The usual "final order" will be a conviction or dismissal, with the "question of law" based upon rulings that led to the result. A striking out of the charge is not enough: DPP v Moore  VSCA 90, (2003) 6 VR 430. An interlocutory order or a question raised but immaterial to the final order is not enough, nor are results of committal proceedings.
Commencement. A s.272 appeal must be instituted within 28 days after the day on which the order complained of was made: 272(3). This is strictly applied, though there is provision for leave to proceed out of time in exceptional circumstances and where there is no material prejudice any other party: s.272(8). The appeal is instituted by application to an Associate Judge of the Supreme Court without notice to any other person. The application is to be supported by affidavit filed before or upon the attendance. For a defence appeal, the informant named upon the charge should be named as the sole respondent. Upon appearance there will usually be attention to the Affidavit, and to questions of law said by the appellant to arise. It is good practice to have proposed questions of law drafted ready for the Associate Judge. If questions are approved, further orders will be made as to service on the respondent and the Magistrate, answering affidavits, reference to the listing system and other matters.
The affidavit. The affidavit is an account of the proceedings at the summary hearing. Typically it is sworn by the defendant, the instructor attending, the prosecutor or the informant. Sometimes it is sworn by the practitioner who appeared at the Magistrates' Court, though if this is so, it is inappropriate for the practitioner to appear on the appeal: R v Roberts VSCA 2. The deponent of the affidavit is really a witness upon the appeal, and it is undesirable that a practitioner appearing should also be a witness. Recordings are now made of the proceedings at the Magistrates' Court. The affidavit may need little more than reference to and exhibiting the transcript. The affidavit should avoid new comment or argument, or references to background matters out of court. The affidavit should have all relevant exhibits within possession or power of possession, including a Magistrates' Court certificate of result and the charge.
The hearing. The hearing could be from within a few weeks or months from the appearance before the Associate Judge. It occurs in the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court. With uncommon and slight exception, the facts as to the hearing at the Magistrates' Court are decided upon the affidavits. The usual practice is that there is no affidavit filed by the Magistrate. There is not always an affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, especially where there is no contest with the contents of the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant.
Remedy. The court may such order as it thinks appropriate: s.272(9). Frequently, upon successful appeal, the case will be remitted to the Magistrates' Court for re-hearing in accordance with law. By consent, the court might make a final order: DPP v Parsons VicRp 1, 1 VR 1. If it has been held there was a factual finding or exercise of discretion no reasonable Magistrate could make, the court might make the appropriate final order, regardless of consent.
Costs. If the appeal is dismissed, it will probably be with the costs of the other party to be paid. If the appeal succeeds, it will probably be with costs. A respondent ordered to pay costs may apply to the court for an indemnity pursuant to the Appeal Costs Act s.13.
The application, and the appeal if leave is granted, is not a re-hearing of trial. It is essentially legal argument about what has occurred at trial.
The Court of Appeal ordinarily for a case of this kind is comprised of two or three judges of Appeal; occasionally more especially if the overruling of a precedent of the Court of Appeal is under consideration; usually only two for interlocutory matters. In any case, if the President of the Court of Appeal so determines, two Judges of Appeal constitute, and may exercise all the jurisdiction and powers: Supreme Court Act s.11; R v Sebalj  VSCA 106.
Applications to the Court of Appeal in Victoria against conviction by jury are governed inter alia by Criminal Procedure Act s.276(1) which provides
Determination of appeal against conviction (1) On an appeal under section 274, the Court of Appeal must allow the appeal against conviction if the appellant satisfies the court that - (a) the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence; or (b) as the result of an error or an irregularity in, or in relation to, the trial there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice; or (c) for any other reason there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice.
The first category, verdict unreasonable or unsupportable having regard to the evidence, has meaning from High Court authority which has developed an "unsafeness jurisdiction" relevant to the Victoria section and other jurisdictions with similar provisions: SKA v R  HCA 13, (2011) 85 ALJR 571; R v Nguyen HCA 38, (2010) 271 ALR 493; Libke v R HCA 30, (2007) 230 CLR 559; M v R  HCA 63, (1994) 181 CLR 487.
A Court of Appeal in considering this kind of unsafeness ground must
ask itself whether, upon the whole of the evidence, it was open to the
jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was
guilty. In considering that question, the appeal court must bear in mind
that the jury has the primary responsibility of determining guilt or
innocence and has had the benefit of seeing and hearing the witnesses.
In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt
which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s
advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a
doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may
conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred. A guilty verdict can
only be said to have been ‘reasonably open’ to the jury if there was no
aspect of the evidence which obliged - as
distinct from entitled - the jury to come to a
Farquharson v R  VSCA 296,
(2012) 36 VR 538; R v Klamo v R VSCA 75; (2008) 18 VR 644 (acquittal entered);
further examples of acquittals entered
O'Reilly v R  VSCA 19; CRR v R  VSCA 142,
(2011) 32 VR 321. The appeal court can have regard to a failure to give evidence at trial by an applicant in a position to know whether he or she committed the offence: MA v R  VSCA 214; Butler v R  VSCA 417,
(2011) 34 VR 165.
Another kind of "unsafeness" ground which may be seen as part of the first category is inconsistency of verdict as between counts against an accused: MFA v R  HCA 53, (2002) 213 CLR 606; Mackenzie v R  HCA 35, (1996) 190 CLR 348;Carrott v R  VSCA 90; Ash v R VSCA 112; R v JA VSCA
169; R v Allen  VSCA 3; R v Le-Gallienne  VSCA 223; also probability of compromise verdict: R v Tran  VSCA 195. There may also be inconsistency of verdict as between separate accused at joint trial: R v Moroz  VSCA 30; R v Iliovski  VSCA 172, (2002) 135 A Crim R 117. There may also be inconsistency between
verdict and failure to agree on verdict:
Tukuafu v R  VSCA 345;
Pillay v R  VSCA 249.
The second category is where as the result of an error or an irregularity in, or in relation to, the trial there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice. It may lie in wrong decision on a question of law. It may lie in material erroneous statement of substantive law or of procedural law. It may lie in erroneous application of law, especially as to a rule of evidence admissibility. At least under forerunner provisions, it was settled that to be distinguished were decisions validly within a legally recognised discretion correctly stated: "It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed... In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred". House v R  HCA 40, (1936) 55 CLR 499. To ask whether a discretion has been properly exercised is not to raise a point of law DPP Ref No 1 of 1984  VicRp 64, VR 727; DPP Ref No 1 of 1992 VicRp 71,  2 VR 405. It would extend in a Commonwealth offence to error as to the constitutionality of provision: R v Wei Tang VSCA 134, (2007) 16 VR 454. The category has overlap with the third category, which often is relied upon instead.
The third category - that on any ground there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice - concerns a multiplicity of other ways a trial may miscarry. Sometimes High Court cases have seen these as further areas within the "unsafeness jurisdiction": Gipp v R  HCA 21, (1998) 194 CLR 106; Ratten v R  HCA 35, (1974) 131 CLR 510.
As a general rule there cannot be miscarriage on a ground unless it
follows point taken by defence at trial:
R  VSCA 339.
It is to be noticed that s.276(1)(b) and (c) recognise a difference between miscarriage of justice and substantial miscarriage of justice: It is substantial miscarriage of justice which must be shown for successful appeal. Baini v R  HCA 59,
(2012) 246 CLR 469; Andelman v R  VSCA 25,
(2013) 227 A Crim R 81 are the leading cases,
see also for exampleBass (a pseudonym) v R  VSCA 350. There is no single universally applicable definition of a substantial miscarriage of justice. That is because the possible kinds of miscarriage of justice dealt with by s 276(1) are too numerous and too different to permit prescription of a singular test. With respect to ss 276(1)(b) and (c) , the types of substantial miscarriage of justice include cases where there has been an error or an irregularity in, or in relation to, the trial and the Court of Appeal cannot be satisfied that the error or irregularity did not make a difference to the outcome of the trial. Those paragraphs also cover cases where there has been a serious departure from the prescribed processes for trial. A substantial miscarriage of justice may occur where there has been a departure from process even if the verdict was open or it is not possible to conclude whether the verdict was open. The question whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice may be affected by the strength of the prosecution case. In such cases, however, the Court of Appeal must be aware of the natural limitations that attend the appellate task. A finding that the conviction was inevitable is merely relevant to the Court’s determination of whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice. It does not conclude the issue. If it is submitted that the verdict was inevitable, the appellant need show no more than that, had there been no error, the jury may have entertained a doubt. In assessing inevitability, the Court of Appeal must decide that question on the written record of the trial. In cases where evidence has been wrongly admitted or excluded, the Court cannot determine that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice unless it determines that it was not open to the jury to entertain a doubt as to guilt. Otherwise, there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice because the result of the trial may have been different (because the state of the evidence before the jury would have been different) had the error not been made.
Recognised topics for grounds of appeal include the following.
(a) Inadequate or erroneous judicial instruction to jury. A trial judge is bound to direct the jury as to any principle of law or rule of practice applicable to the case and ordinarily summarise the evidence and the respective cases for the prosecution and the accused:
Jury Directions Act
ss.65-67;Murrell v R  VSCA 334;Papazoglou v R
 VSCA 194; Alford v Magee  HCA 3, (1952) 85 CLR 437; Domican v R  HCA 13, (1992) 173 CLR 555.
(c) Imbalanced judicial comment on facts or direction to jury, or unwarranted intrusion:Piccolotto v R VSCA 143;R v Gose VSCA 66, (2009) 22
R v Brdarovski VSCA 231, (2006) 166 A Crim R 366;R v Ivanovic  VSCA 238;
R v Lao VSCA 157;
R v Mong  VSCA 203. As a general rule judicial comment to the jury is allowed providing it is made clear to jury that it is unbinding comment.
(d) Failure to discharge jury without verdict due to impugned material or incident where there has been a high degree of need for such discharge. Whether such a need exists will depend upon the circumstances as seen by the judge in the context of the trial and the nature of the impugned material which is said to be prejudicial. However, and notwithstanding the position of primacy of the judge in such matters, there may be cases where an appellate court is driven to the conclusion that the exercise of the discretion adverse to the interests of the accused has occasioned the risk of a substantial miscarriage of justice:
Crofts v R HCA 22, (1996) 186 CLR 427;Walker v R  VSCA 177;R v Halliday  VSCA 195, (2009) 23 VR 419.
(e) Direction by the trial judge a late stage in the trial, that has the effect of materially changing the prosecution's case such as to add a new basis on which the jury could convict the offender, in circumstances where the offender is denied the opportunity of meeting the new case by moulding the defence to it through evidence or through the address to the jury:R v SAB VSCA 150;R v Nguyen VSCA 293.
(f) Substantial possibility that jury mistaken or misled upon some material matter:
Davies v R HCA 27, (1937) 57 CLR 170. An example is a collective misunderstanding of fact by parties and trial
NT v R  VSCA 213;
R v Challoner  VICSC 356.
(h) Trial resulting from refusal to grant adjournment of trial to investigate a question where refusal was not reasonably open:
SM v R  VSCA 332.
(i) Lack of legal representation resulting in an unfair trial:
R v Hoang  VSCA 117.
(j) Inappropriate prosecution conduct:
Whitehorn v R HCA 42, (1983) 152 CLR 657;Woods (a Pseudonym) v R VSCA 233;R v Russo  VSCA 206;
R v Armstrong VICSC 350, 4 VR 533. Crown unjustifiably refusing to call witness wanted called by defence:
R v Jensen  VSCA 266. Crown putting forward, for the first time in final address, a new basis on which it says the accused may be convicted, in circumstances where the defence has not had the opportunity of meeting the new claim:
R v Howard  VSCA 235
(k) Judicial bias, actual or ostensible:
Antoun v R  HCA 2, (2006) 80 ALJR 497.
(l) Juror bias:
Webb v R  HCA 30, (1994) 181 CLR 41;
Zhu v R  VSCA 102;
R v ALH VSCA 129, (2003) 6 VR 276.
(m) Joinder of trial against separate accused shown inappropriate by subsequent events at trial:
R v Alexander and McKenzie VSCA 183, (2002) 6 VR 53; R v Demirok  VicRp 19,  VR 244.
(n) Procedural error, e.g. jury separation without required oath or otherwise irregular: R v Appleby
(1996) 88 A Crim R 456; R v Chaouok VicRp 70,  VR 707.
Upon successful appeal, jurisdiction includes to order a new trial or direct acquittal be entered: Criminal Procedure Act s.277. The latter is in practice exceptional. The power to order a new trial extends to ordering a new trial for an offence for which the appellant could have been convicted at the first trial, including for example a lesser alternative offence provided by statute: AJS v R  HCA 27, (2007) 235 CLR 505. The factors which should influence an appellate court in exercising such a discretion will depend basically on all the facts of each individual case, the circumstances which surrounded the trial, the nature of the miscarriage of justice, the strength of the prosecution case and a full and fair balancing of the public interest and the personal interests of the successful appellant. Such considerations are not exhaustive. See R v Poduska  VSCA 147; R v Wei Tang  VSCA 144, (2007) 16 VR 454; R v Nicoletti  VSCA 175, (2006) 164 A Crim R 81; R v Redmond  VSCA 75; Edwards v R HCA 63, (1993) 178 CLR 213. See also R v Thomas (No 3)  VSCA 300 and R v Thomas (No 4)  VSCA 107 (fresh evidence since trial).
The Court is functus officio i.e. without jurisdiction to re-open a criminal appeal which it has already determined on the merits; there may be such a jurisdiction if the decision has been vitiated by fraud or some other circumstances which rendered its decision a nullity: R v McNamara  1 VR 257; R v GAM  VSCA 185. There is however possible remedy by way of Petition of Mercy pursuant to Criminal Procedure Act s.327; see
Tognolini v R  VSCA 222; R v Alexander VSCA 142; R v GAM  VSCA 23.
Extension of time for appeal or leave against jury verdict of guilty, or against sentence: Criminal Procedure Act s.313.
The Court has regard to both the reasons for delay and the merits of the
appeal, but these two considerations are not necessarily evenly
balanced. Where the merits of the proposed appeal are very poor, even a
satisfactory explanation for the delay might not justify an extension.
On the other hand, where the merits of the putative appeal are very
good, but the explanation for the delay is poor, the Court may incline
towards granting an extension:
Ludwig v R  VSCA 35;
Roth (a Pseudonym) v R
 VSCA 242;
Bowling v R  VSCA 87; Jopar v R  VSCA
There is provision for prosecution reference of points of law to the Court of Appeal after acquittal at trial or upon County Court appeal, though the acquittal cannot be disturbed. These are known as a Director's Reference: Criminal Procedure Act s.308. In practice, very few are brought. An example (under previous legislation) is DPP Ref No1 of 2001  VSCA 89.
> To Court of Appeal against conviction by County Court or Supreme Court after plea of guilty
Conviction appeal in these circumstances is open if it appears (1) that the appellant did not appreciate the nature of the charge or did not intend to admit guilt, or (2) that upon the admitted facts could not in law have been convicted of the offence charged, or (3) that for any other reason there has been miscarriage of justice: R v Holden  VSCA 254.
> To Court of Appeal against sentence by County Court or Supreme Court
These are appeals concerning sentence first imposed by County Court or Supreme Court after jury trial or plea of guilty.
Criminal Procedure Act Part 6.3; Supreme Court (Criminal Procedure) Rules. The application if by a sentenced person initially is under Criminal Procedure Act s.278 for leave to appeal which usually is set down for a separate hearing in or if so elected by the applicant, determined on the papers without an oral hearing. Where it is held arguable that there has been a sentencing error, even with respect to an individual sentence, leave must be granted unless the judge is satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect that a less severe sentence would be imposed on appeal: Ludeman v R  VSCA 333.
To succeed on the appeal, it is necessary to establish matters such as specific error of statute, error of principle, weighting of sentencing factor not reasonably open, finding of sentencing facts not reasonably open, disparity with co-offenders or manifest excess of sentence: R v Taylor and O'Meally  VicRp 46,  VR 285. Another possible basis is procedural unfairness: R v Alexandridis VSCA 126.
Manifest excess of sentence is a non-specific error frequently not admitting of amplification. It is a residuary category of error; appellate intervention on this ground is not justified just because a sentence is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases; the sentence imposed must be explicable only on the ground of a misapplication of principle, even if the statement of reasons of the sentencing judge does not make such misapplication apparent: Wong v R  HCA 64, (2001) 207 CLR 58; R v S  VSCA 134. The sentence must be obviously, or strikingly, excessive, such that the appeal court is entitled to conclude that there was no proper exercise of the sentencing discretion at all: R v Winter  VSCA 144.
The remedy is re-sentence, or remittal to the County Court: Criminal Procedure Act s. 286. It has been contrary to practice to increase without a warning and to grant leave to abandon application for leave to appeal if sought.
There is Court of Appeal power on a sentence appeal to give or review a guideline judgment: Sentencing Act ss. 6AA-6AG. This may set out (a) criteria to be applied in selecting among various sentencing alternatives; (b) the weight to be given to the various purposes specified in section 5(1) for which a sentence may be imposed; (c) the criteria by which a sentencing court is to determine the gravity of an offence; (d) the criteria which a sentencing court may use to reduce the sentence for an offence; (e) the weighting to be given to relevant criteria; (f) any other matter consistent with the principles contained in this Act.
In the Court of Appeal, fresh evidence which relates to events which have occurred since sentence will be received if it demonstrates the true significance of facts in existence at sentence to be harsher to the offender than had then been understood; such fresh evidence may vitiate the sentencing discretion:
Mileto v R  VSCA 161 (forfeiture);
Spence v R  VSCA 197 ill health); Marsh v R VSCA 6 (victim of offending subsequently forgiving); R v Cochrane VSCA 60 and R v Mourad VSCA 4 (after sentence cancellation of parole on another matter);R v Dang VSCA 183 and R v McLeod  VSCA 183, (2007) 16 VR 682 (forfeiture); R v Alashkar VSCA 182 (after sentence cancellation of parole on another matter); R v Jahanara VSCA 260 (lesser injuries to victim); R v Nguyen  VSCA 184 (hardship to family); R v Wooden  VSCA 97; R v SH  VSCA 83 (mental illness and need for protection); R v Pividor  VSCA 174 (protection required in prison);R v Spagnolo  VSCA 126,
(2000) 114 A Crim R 98 (illness); R v Rostom VICSC 213, 2 VR 97 (protection required in prison);R v Eliasen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391 (illness). Outside of these principles is evidence which does no more than show the working out of matters that were, in general terms, recognised and taken into account at the time of sentence: R v Jones  VSCA 266; R v McLachlan  VSCA 87, (2004) 8 VR 403.
There is a discretion to receive evidence that ought to have been but was not before the sentencing judge, the evidence being admitted to avoid a miscarriage of justice: R v Cako  VSCA 147; DPP v Burgess  VSCA  VSCA 135, R v Mandala  VSCA 159.
For prosecution appeals against sentence, the main provisions are Criminal Procedure Act ss.287-294. The right conferred upon the Director of Public Prosecutions to appeal against sentence is conditioned upon the Director being satisfied that there was an error in the sentence imposed, that a different sentence ought to have been imposed and that it is in the public interest that an appeal be brought; if the Court finds that there is an error and that a different sentence should be imposed, it must allow the appeal and if either of these requirements is not met, it must dismiss the appeal; the need to be satisfied that a different sentence should be imposed serves to preserve a good part, at least, of the residual discretion of the Court which existed under previous law: DPP v Karazisis  VSCA 350. In the event that prosecution appeal is allowed, the Court must set aside the sentence imposed by the originating court and impose the sentence, whether more or less severe, that it considers appropriate taking into account any factor, other than double jeopardy, that it regards as relevant to re-sentencing the offender: s.290; DPP v Karazisis.
DPP v Zhuang  VSCA 96.
> Order 56 Judicial Review
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules order 56. This is a course applying both to criminal and non-criminal matters, though of narrow application and relatively uncommon. Judicial review may lie to correct inferior courts (and tribunals) which commit jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice (also against public bodies which act beyond lawful power i.e. ultra vires or err in the exercise of power). It also may lie to correct inferior courts (and tribunals) which commit error on the face of the record or have been subject of fraud. The record includes reasons: Administrative Law Act s.10; Lianos v Inner Eastern Health Care Network VSCA 53; Flynn v DPP  1 VR 322; Kuek v Wellens VSC 326; Sidebottom v County Court  VSC 18.
One breach of natural justice is bias, actual or ostensible: Antoun v R  HCA 2, (2006) 80 ALJR 497; Webb R HCA 30, (1994) 181 CLR 41; Livesey v NSW Bar Association  HCA 17, (1983) 151 CLR 288. Importance of requesting disqualification or objecting: Vakuata v R  HCA 28, (1989) 167 CLR 568; Humphrey v Wills VicRp 42, VR 439; Rozenes v Kelly  VicRp 20, 1 VR 320; Willis v Magistrates' Court (1996) 89 A Crim R 273.
An order at committal proceedings for Victorian offences committing for trial or refusing to commit is regarded as ministerial and not judicial and as not amenable to certiorari: Potter v Tural  VSCA 227.
It has become accepted, at least implicitly, that the County Court is an inferior court and not made otherwise by County Court Act s.36A. There is however some uncertainty whether certiorari can ever lie in County Court criminal proceedings which are between arraignment and conclusion on an issue which ultimately would be exposed to Court of Appeal criminal jurisdiction: McGuire v DPP  VSC 11. Note however Administrative Law Act s.12 by which any proceeding may be removed into the Supreme Court notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in an Act passed before such commencement.
There remains a discretion not to grant certiorari, mandamus or prohibition where a basis is made out. One reason tending against grant is where there is provision for an alternative and preferable remedy:
Kuek v Victoria Legal Aid VSCA 80. Another reason tending against grant is the undesirability of fragmenting criminal trial proceedings:
Iorlano v R  HCA 43, (1983) 151 CLR 678; Rozenes, ex parte Burd (1994) 68 ALJR 372;
Phung v Victoria Legal Aid  VSC 1.
Loss in the Court of Appeal (even for the prosecution) is open to High Court appeal. There is though formidable special leave requirement before the substantive issues will be heard: see Constitution s.73, Judiciary Act Part V Division 1; Liberato v R HCA 66, (1985) 159 CLR 507. Special leave applications are often heard separately, typically in Melbourne if of Victoria origin. Remitter from High Court to Court of Appeal: R v Weiss (No 2)  VSCA 161.
this page is www.justd.com/crimappeals.htm
page author Don Just barrister of Victorian Bar Melbourne, Victoria, Australia